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11 Introduction
In the operations research literature, numerous algorithms and heuristics for network op-
timization problems are oﬀered. In game theoretic approaches to this type of problems,
diﬀerent agents control the elements of the network. Therefore, next to ﬁnding optimal
solutions, this adds the problem of dividing the costs or beneﬁts generated by such so-
lutions over the involved agents. An overview of several classes of games arising from
problems in operations research is provided by Curiel (1997).
Only recently two game theoretical approaches have been initiated to shortest path
problems: Fragnelli, Garc´ ıa-Jurado, and M´ endez-Naya (2000) and Voorneveld and Grahn
(2000). The present paper follow the model of Voorneveld and Grahn (2000). In this
model each player owns arcs or connections in a ﬁnite network. There are costs associated
to the use of each arc. For each player there is a reward (possibly equal to zero) if he
transports his goods from source to sink.The value of a coalition is the maximal proﬁt
it can generate by transporting its goods from source to sink via a shortest path owned
by this coalition. In these shortest path games, which are brieﬂyr e v i e w e di nS e c t i o n3 ,
it is shown that the core and the bargaining set of Davis and Maschler (1963) and Zhou
(1994) coincide.
Solymosi (1999) provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the core and the
Davis-Maschler bargaining set to coincide. According to these conditions, certain games,
induced by imputations in the bargaining set, have to be balanced. In practice however,
it is very hard to prove that a certain class of games satisfy these conditions. Therefore
this paper gives a more direct approach.
B a s i cg a m et h e o r e t i c a ld e ﬁnitions are given in Section 2. In Section 3 shortest path
games are deﬁned. Section 4 contain the main result of the paper: the core and the
bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou are shown to coincide in shortest path games.
2 Preliminaries
This section settles matters of notation and deﬁnes basic game theoretic concepts.
For a ﬁnite set N,2 N = {S : S ⊆ N} denotes the collection of all subsets of N.I R
denotes the set of reals, I R+ =[ 0 ,∞) the set of nonnegative reals. For (xi)i∈N,w h e r e
xi ∈ IR f o r e a c h i ∈ N,a n df o ras u b s e tS ⊆ N,w ed e n o t ex(S)=
P
i∈S xi.T h ee n do f
proofs is indicates with the symbol 2,t h ee n do fd e ﬁnitions, examples, and remarks with
the symbol /.
Recall that a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a tuple (N,v),
where N is a ﬁnite set of players and v :2 N \{ ∅} → I R is a function that assigns to each
coalition S ∈ 2N \{ ∅} its value v(S) ∈ IR .
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let (N,v) be a TU-game. A vector (xi)i∈S of real numbers is an S-feasible
payoﬀ vector if x(S)=v (S). /
An N-feasible payoﬀ vector is refered to as a feasible payoﬀ proﬁle.
2Deﬁnition 2.2 An imputation of (N,v) is a feasible payoﬀ proﬁle x ∈ IR f o r w h i c h




N : x(N)=v(N)a n dxi ≥ v({i}) ∀i ∈ N
ª
/
The bargaining set is a solution concept for cooperative games and consists of those
imputations for which every objection is refuted by a counterobjection.
Let x be an imputation of a TU-game (N,v). Following Davis and Maschler (1963)
objections and counterobjections are deﬁned as follows:
• Ap a i r( y,S), where S is a coalition and y is an S-feasible payoﬀ vector, is an
objection of i against j to x if S includes i but not j and yk >x k for all k ∈ S.
• Ap a i r( z,K), where K is a coalition and z is a K-feasible payoﬀ vector, is a
counterobjection to the objection (y,S)o fi against j if K includes j but not i,
zk ≥ xk for all k ∈ K\S,a n dzk ≥ yk for all k ∈ K ∩ S.
The bargaining set is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.3 The bargaining set B(N,v)o faT U - g a m e( N,v) is the set of all imputa-
tions x with the property that for every objection (y,S)o fa n yp l a y e ri against any other
player j to x there is a counterobjection to (y,S)b yj. /
Deﬁnition 2.4 T h ec o r eo fag a m e( N,v)i st h es e t
C(N,v)={x ∈ IR
N | x(N)=v(N)a n dx(S) ≥ v(S)f o re a c hS ∈ 2
N \{ ∅}}.
/
Note that an imputation is in the core if and only if no player has an objection against
any other player; hence the core is a subset of the bargaining set.
3 Shortest path games
This section summarizes the model of shortest path games of Voorneveld and Grahn
(2000). In this model there is a ﬁnite set of players. Each player owns arcs or connections
in a ﬁnite network. There are costs associated to the use of each arc. Each player receives
a nonnegative reward if he manages to transport a good from the source of the network
to its sink.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A shortest path problem is a tuple hN,V,(Ai)i∈N,w,(ri)i∈Ni,w h e r e







Figure 1: A shortest path problem
• V is a ﬁnite set of vertices with two special elements: the source So and the sink
Si;
• each player i ∈ N owns a set Ai ⊆ V × V of directed arcs in the network;
• the function w : ∪i∈N{i}×Ai → IR + assigns a cost (or length, or weight) to all the
arcs owned by the players. The cost assigned to arc (a,b)o w n e db yp l a y e ri ∈ N is
w(i,(a,b)) ∈ IR +;
• each player i ∈ N receives a reward ri ∈ IR + for transporting his goods from the
source to the sink.
/
Notice that more than one player can own an arc between two vertices, and that the costs
of an arc can depend on its owner. The following example illustrates the deﬁnition of a
shortest path game.
Example 3.2 The shortest path problem with player set N = {1,2,3}, vertex set
V = {So,Si,v}, the players respectively owning arc sets A1 = {(So,v),(So,Si)},A 2 =
{(v,Si)},A 3 = ∅,a n dc o s t sw(1,(So,v)) = w(2,(v,Si)) = 1,w(1,(So,Si)) = 3 is de-
picted in Figure 1 (where it is assumed that arcs are directed from left to right). The
numbers 2;1 next to the arc (v,Si), for instance, indicate that this arc is owned by player
2 and that the costs of this arc owned by player 2 equal 1. Take the rewards equal to
r1 = r2 = r3 =2 . /
Let S ∈ 2N \{∅} be a coalition of players. A path owned by the players in S is a sequence
(v1,i 1,v 2,i 2,...,i m−1,v m) of vertices vk and players ik such that v1 = So, vm = Si,a n d
for each k ∈ {1,...,m−1} the arc (vk,v k+1) is owned by player ik ∈ S.L e tP(S)d e n o t e
the collection of all paths owned by coalition S.
The costs associated to a path p =( v1,i 1,v 2,i 2,...,i m−1,v m) ∈ P(S)a r ed e ﬁned as





4Obviously, if a coalition S has to go from source to sink, it will choose among its alterna-
tives in P(S) the path with minimal costs. Deﬁne for each S ∈ 2N \{ ∅}:
c(S)=
½
minp∈P(S) cost(p)i f P(S) 6= ∅,
∞ otherwise.
Shortest paths in directed networks can be determined, for instance, by the algorithm of
Dijkstra (1959).
From now on, when we refer to ‘a shortest path’ without explicitly stating a coalition
owning it, we mean a shortest path owned by the grand coalition N.
The cooperative game associated with a shortest path problem reﬂects the following
intuition: if a coalition S ∈ 2N \{ ∅} transports its goods from source to sink, it will
receive a total reward r(S)=
P
i∈S ri and incur costs c(S), the costs of the cheapest
alternative S has to go from source to sink. If r(S) − c(S) > 0, coalition S makes a
proﬁt. If r(S) − c(S) ≤ 0, coalition S can generate proﬁtz e r ob ys i m p l yd o i n gn o t h i n g .
Therefore, coalition S can make a proﬁtm a x {r(S) − c(S),0}.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let hN,V,(Ai)i∈N,w,(ri)i∈Ni be a shortest path problem. The associated
shortest path game (N,v)i sd e ﬁned as follows:
∀S ∈ 2
N \{ ∅} : v(S)=m a x {r(S) − c(S),0}.
/
Let S,T ∈ 2N \{ ∅},S ⊆ T.T h e n r(S) ≤ r(T)a n dc(S) ≥ c(T), so v(S) ≤ v(T): the
shortest path game (N,v) is monotonic.
Example 3.4 In the shortest path problem of Example 3.2, coalition {2}and {3} do not
own a path: c({i})=∞ for i =2 ,3. The cooperative game associated with the shortest
path problem is given by v({1})=m a x {r1 − c({1}),0} =m a x {2 − 3,0} =0 ,v({2})=
v({3})=m a x {2 −∞ ,0} =0 ,v({1,2})=m a x{r({1,2}) − c({1,2}),0} =2 ,v({1,3})=
1,v({2,3})=0 ,v(N)=4 . /
Voorneveld and Grahn (2000) prove that shortest path games are totally balanced, in-
dicate easy ways to construct core elements and provide the existence of population
monotonic allocation schemes (Sprumont, 1990). Moreover, they provide a cost allo-
cation mechanism taking into account opportunity cost and the role of players that are
crucial to the construction of the shortest path.
4 Core and bargaining set coincide
In this section, the bargaining set is shown to coincide with the core for shortest path
games. We already know that C (N,v) ⊆ B (N,v) for each TU-game (N,v). The intuition
behind the proof of C (N,v) ⊇ B (N,v) is roughly as follows:
5Let x be an imputation that is not in the core. Let T be the set of players who get
less then their reward by allocation x.L e tS be the ”best” coalition for T to join if the
players in T have to pay c(S)a n dx(S\T)−r(S\T) (the cost of the shortest path owned
by S and the cost of players in S who get more then their reward). The players in T are
the only players who contribute to the cost of the used path and to the cost of players
who according to allocation x, get more than their reward. S also is the ”best” coalition
for every subset P ⊂ T to join. Let j ∈ argmaxt∈N\S xt − rt, i.e., the player outside S
who is most ”costly”. For each i ∈ T there is an objection (S,y) against player j.F o r
player j to counterobject there has to be a counterobjection (K,z) such that i / ∈ K.W e
prove that P = K ∩ T 6= ∅, i.e. to counterobject player j has to use players in T. Since
S is the best coalition for P ⊂ T to join, we know that the cost of P for joining coalition
K is equal or larger to the cost of joining coalition S. But since i / ∈ K and xi <r i it is
c l e a rt h a tt h ec o s to fP joining K is larger then the cost of joining S. This means that
at least one player in P must be worse oﬀ in (K,z)t h a ni n( S,y). Hence, there is no
counterobjection (K,z), so x / ∈ B (N,v).
Lemma 4.1 Let hN,V,(Ai)i∈N,w,(ri)i∈Ni be a shortest path problem and (N,v) the as-
sociated shortest path game. Let x ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v) and T = {i ∈ N : xi <r i}. Let
S ∈ minP∈2N x(P) − v(P),t h e n
i) T 6= ∅;
ii) S 6= N, x(S) − v(S) < 0a n dT ⊆ S;
iii) S\T solves minP⊆N\T x(P) − r(P)+c(P ∪ T).
Proof. i) Assume that T = ∅. Then xi ≥ ri ∀i ∈ N. Since x(N)=v(N) ≤ r(N)
we have that xi = ri ∀i ∈ N.B u ti fx ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v), then r = x ∈ C (N,v), since
x(R)=r(R) ≥ v (R)f o re a c hR ⊆ N, contradicting the assumption that x / ∈ C (N,v).
ii) x ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v) implies that x(P) − v(P) < 0 for some coalition P. Since
S ∈ minP∈2N x(P)−v(P)a n dx(N)=v(N)i tf o l l o w st h a tS 6= N,a n dx(S)−v (S) < 0.
Assume that i ∈ T\S,t h e n
x(S) − v(S) >x i − v (S) − ri + x(S)
≥ x(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ {i}),
contradicting that S ∈ argminP∈2N x(P) − v(P). Hence T\S = ∅ so T ⊆ S.
iii) T ⊆ S and S ∈ minP∈2N x(P) − v(P)g i v e st h a tS\T solves
min
P⊆N\T





x(P) − r(P)+c(P ∪ T)
¸
+ x(T) − r(T),
so S\T ∈ minP⊆N\T x(P) − r(P)+c(P ∪ T). 2
6Lemma 4.2 Let hN,V,(Ai)i∈N,w,(ri)i∈Ni be a shortest path problem and (N,v) the as-
sociated shortest path game. Let x ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v) and sets S and T as in Lemma
4.1. Let i ∈ T object to
j ∈ arg max
t∈N\S
xt − rt
via an objection (S,y). Assume that (K,z) is a counterobjection of j to (S,y), i.e. z is a
K-feasible payoﬀ vector such that:
zk ≥ xk ∀k ∈ K\S
zk ≥ yk >x k ∀k ∈ K ∩ S.
then
i) v(K)=r(K) − c(K);
ii) P = K ∩ T 6= ∅.
Proof. i) Assume that r(K)−c(K) < 0. Then v(K) = 0 which gives that z (K)=0 .
By the deﬁnition of a counterobjection and individual rationality of x, it follows that
0=z (K) ≥ x(K) ≥
P
i∈K v({i}) ≥ 0s ox(K)=0 . This gives that xj = rj =0 , and
since j ∈ argmaxt∈N\S xt − rt it follows that xk = rk =0∀k ∈ N\S. This gives that
x(S) − v(S)=x(N) − v(S) ≥ x(N) − v(N) = 0 contradicting Lemma 4.1 ii). Hence
v(K)=r(K) − c(K) ≥ 0
ii) Discern two cases:
CASE 1: c(K) > 0
If K ∩ T = ∅,t h e nzk ≥ xk ≥ rk ∀k ∈ K implies z (K) ≥ r(K) >r(K) − c(K)=v(K),
contradicting that z is K-feasible payoﬀ vector. Hence K ∩ T 6= ∅.
CASE 2: c(K)=0
c(K)=0g i v e st h a txj − rj > 0. Otherwise, rk = xk ∀k ∈ N\S.B u tt h e nc(N)=0i m -
plies that x(N)=v (N)=r(N), so x(S)=r(S) ≥ v(S), contradicting v (S)−x(S) > 0.
Assume that K ∩ T = ∅,t h e nzk ≥ xk ≥ rk ∀k ∈ K and xj − rj > 0 implies
z (K) >r(K)=v(K), contradicting that z is K-feasible payoﬀ vector. Hence K∩T 6= ∅.
2
Lemma 4.3 Let hN,V,(Ai)i∈N,w,(ri)i∈Ni be a shortest path problem and (N,v) the as-
sociated shortest path game. Let x ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v). Let S and T be deﬁned as in
Lemma 4.1 and take K, P, y and z as in Lemma 4.2. Deﬁne
MS := x(S\T) − r(S\T)+c(S)
and
MK := z (K\P) − r(K\P)+c(K).
Then MK ≥ MS.
7Proof.
MK = z (K\P) − r(K\P)+c(K)
≥ x(K\P) − r(K\P)+c(K)
= x(K\T) − r(K\T)+c(K)
≥ x(K\T) − r(K\T)+c(K ∪ T)
≥ x(S\T) − r(S\T)+c(S\T ∪ T)
= MS,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of a counterobjection, the second
from decreasingness of the cost function, and the third inequality from Lemma 4.1 iii). 2
Proposition 4.4 Let hN,V,(Ai)i∈N,w,(ri)i∈Ni be a shortest path problem and (N,v) the
associated shortest path game. Then the core and the bargaining set of (N,v) coincide.
Proof. We already know that C (N,v) ⊆ B (N,v). To prove that C (N,v) ⊇ B (N,v).
Let x ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v)a n dT = {i ∈ N : xi <r i}. Then lemma 4.1 i) gives T 6= ∅. Let
S ∈ arg max
P∈2N v(P) − x(P).
Then lemma 4.1 iii) gives that S\T solves
min
P⊆N\T
x(P) − r(P)+c(P ∪ T).
Let (S,y)b ea no b j e c t i o no fp l a y e ri ∈ T against player j ∈ N\S with
j ∈ arg max
t∈N\S
xt − rt.
Suppose that (K,z) is a counterobjection of j ∈ N\S i.e. z is a K-feasible payoﬀ vector
such that:
zk ≥ xk ∀k ∈ K\S
zk ≥ yk >x k ∀k ∈ K ∩ S.
Let P := K ∩ T, so P ⊂ T. Lemma 4.2 ii) gives that P 6= ∅. Deﬁne
MS := x(T\S) − r(T\S)+c(S)
and
MK := z (K\P) − r(K\P)+c(K).
Discern ﬁve cases:
8CASE I: c(S) > 0a n dS = T
Deﬁne
yk = xk +
rk − xk
r(T) − x(T)
(v(S) − x(S)) ∀k ∈ S = T.
Then y (S)=v (S)a n drk >y k >x k ∀k ∈ S = T,s i n c erk >x k for all k ∈ S = T and
0 <v(S) − x(S)=r(S) − c(S) − x(S) <r (S) − x(S)=r(T) − x(T) implies that
v(S)−x(S)
r(T)−x(T) ∈ (0,1). So (S,y)i sa no b j e c t i o n .T h e n :
MK ≥ MS
= c(S)
= r(T) − y (T)
= r(T\{i}) − y(T\{i})+ri − yi
>r (T\{i}) − y(T\{i})
≥ r(P) − y (P)
≥ r(P) − z (P)
= MK.
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 4.3. The ﬁrst equality follows from S = T
and y(T)=v(T)=r(T) − c(T). The second inequality follows from ri >y i when
c(S) > 0. The third inequality from P ⊂ T and rk >y k ∀k ∈ T. The last inequality
follows from z (P) ≥ y (P)b yd e ﬁnition of a counterobjection. But MK >M K is a
contradiction. Hence there is no counterobjection (K,z).
CASE II: c(S) > 0, S 6= T
Then
0 <v (S) − x(S)
= r(S) − c(S) − x(S)
= r(S\T) − x(S\T) − c(S)+r(T) − x(T)
<r (T) − x(T),










yk = xk +
rk − xk
r(T) − x(T)
(v(S) − x(S)) ∀k ∈ T\i
yi = xi +
ri − xi
r(T) − x(T)
(v (S) − x(S)) − ε




9Then y(S)=v (S)a n drk >y k >x k ∀k ∈ T, yk >x k ∀k ∈ S\T, so (S,y)i sa no b j e c t i o n
of i against j.T h e n
MK ≥ MS
= x(S\T) − r(S\T)+c(S)
= r(T) − x(T)+x(S) − r(S)+c(S)
= r(T) − x(T)+[ x(S) − v(S)]
= r(T) − y(T) − ε
= r(T\{i}) − y (T\{i})+ri − yi − ε
>r (T\{i}) − y (T\{i})
≥ r(P) − y (P)
≥ r(P) − z (P)
= MK,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 4.3. The fourth equality follows from
y (T)=x(T)+v (S) − x(S) − ε. The second inequality follows from ri − xi > 0a n d
v(S)−x(S)
r(T)−x(T) ∈ (0,1). But MK >M K is a contradiction. Hence there is no counterobjection
(K,z).
CASE III: c(S)=0 ,S = T
Let yk = rk ∀k ∈ S = T.T h e n( S,y) is an objection. By monotonicity c(N)=0 . Hence
x(N)=v(N)=r(N)a n dv (S)=r(S) >x(S) implies r(N\S) <x(N\S), so rj <x j.
Then
zk ≥ xk ≥ rk ∀k ∈ K\S, k 6= j
zj ≥ xj >r j
zk ≥ yk = rk ∀k ∈ K ∩ S.
This gives z (K) >r(K) ≥ v(K), contradicting that z (K)=v(K). Hence there is no
counterobjection (K,z).
CASE IV: c(S)=0 ,S 6= T, rk = xk ∀k ∈ S\T
Let
yk = rk if k ∈ T\{i}
yi = ri − ε
yk = rk +
ε
|S\T|
if k ∈ S\T.
with ε ∈ (0,r i − xi). Then y (S)=r(S)=v(S)a n dyk >x k ∀k ∈ S,s o( S,y)i sa n
objection. As in CASE III rj <x j. Then
zk ≥ xk ≥ rk ∀k ∈ K\S, k 6= j
zj ≥ xj >r j
zk ≥ yk = rk ∀k ∈ K ∩ S.
10So z (K) >r(K) ≥ v (K), a contradiction. Hence there is no counterobjection (K,z).
CASE V: c(S)=0 ,S 6= T, rk <x k for some k ∈ S\T
Then
0 <v (S) − x(S)
= r(S) − c(S) − x(S)
= r(S\T) − x(S\T) − c(S)+r(T) − x(T)
<r (T) − x(T),
where the last inequality follows from r(S\T) − x(S\T) ≤ 0a n dc(S) > 0. Hence
v(S)−x(S)
r(T)−x(T) ∈ (0,1).
Proceeding as in Case II yields a contradiction. Hence there is no counterobjection
(K,z).
Since the ﬁve cases are exhaustive, there exists an uncountered objection for each
x ∈ I (N,v)\C (N,v). This shows that C (N,v) ⊇ B (N,v), ﬁnishing the proof. 2
Notice that case II and IV are almost identical and that case III and IV are similar to
each other.
The bargaining set of Zhou (1994) imposes additional conditions on the counterobjec-
tion (K,z) in the proof above, namely:
• K\S 6= ∅, which is true since j ∈ K\S;
• S\K 6= ∅, which is true since i ∈ S\K;
• S ∩ K 6= ∅, which is true since S ∩ K = P 6= ∅.
Consequently the proof also indicates that the core coincides with Zhou’s bargaining set.
It is easy to see that the core and bargaining set do not necessarily coincide in the
shortest path games of Fragnelli et al. (2000); their games are not necessarily balanced,
while the bargaining set always is nonempty.
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